Contrary to the question's framing, Rochambeau did not initially favor Chesapeake Bay—he insisted on it as the condition for French naval cooperation. This strategic disagreement with Washington shaped the war's decisive campaign.
Washington's Plan: Joint Franco-American siege of NYC. Requires French fleet to block British naval escape/reinforcement.
Rochambeau's Counter: NYC too heavily fortified (20,000+ British); siege unlikely to succeed. Instead, he argues for marching south to Virginia where Cornwallis is building a base at Yorktown—if de Grasse brings the fleet to Chesapeake Bay.
Rochambeau writes de Grasse (via fast frigate): "Send your fleet to Chesapeake Bay. We will march south. Cornwallis can be trapped." De Grasse agrees—28 ships, 3,000 troops.
August 14, 1781: Washington receives de Grasse's confirmation. Abandons NYC plan. Allied armies march 450 miles in 5 weeks—the "Celebrated March"—meeting Lafayette near Yorktown.
Rochambeau's insistence on Chesapeake Bay—over Washington's NYC preference—concentrated allied force where British vulnerability was greatest. French naval superiority (temporary but decisive) enabled the trap. Rochambeau's diplomatic-strategic judgment was the linchpin.