A cartel is a formal agreement among competing firms to coordinate prices, output, or market allocation—essentially acting as a monopoly. While theoretically profitable, cartels face structural instability that makes them notoriously difficult to sustain.
Each member faces individual incentive to cheat: secretly lower prices or exceed quotas to gain market share and short-term profit. If all cheat, cartel collapses. If one cheats while others comply, cheater gains disproportionately. This creates inherent tension between collective and individual rationality.
Forms: secret price cuts, hidden capacity expansion, off-invoice discounts, side payments to buyers. Detection is difficult—firms monitor each other but lack perfect information. Punishment strategies (price wars) hurt everyone.
Non-member firms benefit from cartel's high prices without sharing discipline costs. They undercut cartel prices slightly, capturing market share. Cartel must either absorb loss or expand membership—diluting profits further.
Most jurisdictions criminalize cartels (US Sherman Act, EU Article 101, China AML). Enforcement tools: leniency programs (first confessor gets immunity), wiretaps, dawn raids, whistleblower rewards. Penalties: fines (10%+ global revenue), executive imprisonment, civil damages (treble in US).
Economic cycles, technological disruption, substitute emergence, input cost volatility—all undermine coordinated pricing. Cartels lack flexibility to adapt collectively; unilateral responses break agreements.
Even under ideal conditions, cartels tend toward decay. The economic incentive to defect is simply too strong—making cartels the exception, not the rule, in market organization.