The claim that South Korea's export stagnation was primarily caused by a weak Japanese yen is an oversimplification. While yen depreciation (especially 2012–2014 under Abenomics) hurt Korean competitiveness in overlapping sectors (autos, electronics, machinery), multiple structural and cyclical forces were at play.
A weak yen amplified Korea's challenges in third markets (e.g., U.S., EU) where Japanese and Korean goods compete head-to-head. But it was a contributing factor, not the root cause. Korea's own currency strength, cost structure, and the global tech cycle were more decisive.
Korea pursued FTA expansion (52 agreements), innovation subsidies (K-New Deal), and currency intervention (sterilized) to offset. Results mixed; export growth revived only with 2017–18 semiconductor supercycle and 2020–21 pandemic digital demand surge.
Attributing the slowdown mainly to the yen ignores the multidimensional restructuring of East Asian trade.